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Social Cohesion as a Real-life Phenomenon: Exploring the Validity of the 
Universalist and Particularist Perspectives 
 
Abstract: 
Unlike most studies on social cohesion, this study explores the concept as a real-life macro-
level phenomenon. It assesses to what extent the conceptions of social cohesion suggested by 
several macro-level approaches represent coherent empirically observable forms of social 
cohesion. Additionally it discusses two perspectives on social cohesion – the universalist and 
the particularist perspective. The former would expect social cohesion to be  related to stages 
of socio-economic development. The latter hypothesizes enduring, regionally unique regimes 
of social cohesion resisting the homogenizing pressures of modernization. The paper finds 
evidence for both perspectives. On the one hand, a syndrome of social cohesion was 
identified consisting of trust, equality, order (i.e. lack of crime) and consensus on basic values 
which correlates closely with indicators of socio-economic development. This finding 
supports the universalist perspective. On the other hand, and consistent with the particularist 
perspective, the study found regionally unique patterns for Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and Scandinavia.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Globalization, and the socio-economic restructuring and migration processes it 
involves, have put social cohesion decidedly on the political agenda. Politicians in 
Western Europe fear that the rapid economic changes and the ongoing influx of 
migrants are steadily undermining the glue that holds society together. These concerns 
have only been fanned by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
London and Madrid Underground, and by the steady process of individualization, 
which according to many politicians can be blamed for producing atomization and 
disengagement, considered to be the opposites of social cohesion.  
 Despite the increasing salience of the term social cohesion in policy circles, 
there is little clarity on its meaning as scholars so far have not been able to reach 
agreement on a definition of the concept. In fact, although inspired by Durkheim‟s 
relatively parsimonious concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity, contemporary 
scholars have only complicated the concept by showing the distinct propensity to 
understand social cohesion as a multidimensional and multilevel phenomenon 
representing some desirable state of affairs. Put differently, many modern approaches 
provide elaborate and rather ideal and utopian understandings of the term. Judith 
Maxwell (1996, 3), for instance, understands social cohesion as “building shared 
values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, 
and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common 
enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same 
community”. Even the relatively parsimonious definition suggested by Chan et al 
(2006, 290) contains several constituent elements: “Social cohesion is a state of 
affairs concerning both the vertical and horizontal interactions among members of 
society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that include trust, a sense of 
belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral 
manifestations”. 
 Remarkably, to my knowledge none of the authors providing elaborate 
definitions of the concept have explored whether the proposed constituent 
components are interrelated. In other words, are societies characterized by value 
consensus also more equal, more trusting, more civically minded, and less criminal? 
Can societies be identified displaying the proposed form of social cohesion with all 
the positive qualities it is said to include? It is important to explore this since we need 
to know whether some proposed version of social cohesion refers to an actual real-life 
phenomenon or merely to a hypothetical state of affairs. If the latter is the case, 
policies devised to enhance social cohesion are likely to fail, for instance because they 
benefit only some constituent components and have unintended negative side effects 
for other components.  
This study will therefore explore whether one or several phenomena can be 
observed empirically that combine components associated with social cohesion and 
that could thus be labeled as real-life manifestations of social cohesion. Additionally, 
it will assess to what extent these real-life manifestations conform to perspectives that 
I labeled “universalist” and “particularist” (see explanation in the third section). I start 
by explaining the distinct approach followed by this study and by reviewing the main 
theoretical approaches to social cohesion that identify it as a macro-level 
phenomenon. The purpose of this exercise is to identify a collection of empirically 
observable components of social cohesion suggested by these approaches. I then 
discuss the universalist and particularist perspectives and explain which forms of 
social cohesion would support either of these perspectives. Subsequently, I explain 
the data sources, the indicators selected to tap the social cohesion components and the 
methods of analysis. Finally I present the main findings.  
 
 
Social cohesion: assessing macro-level approaches 
 
Interestingly, even most of the empirical studies of social cohesion have not critically 
engaged with the multidimensional conception of social cohesion advanced by many 
theoretical approaches. These studies have by and large proceeded from one 
theoretical approach and explored how the concepts offered by such an approach can 
be made measurable. Examples of such studies are Letki (2008) and Rajulton et al 
(2007), who developed measurements of social cohesion as a local phenomenon, and 
Dickes et al (2009), who relied on Bernard‟s (1999) theoretical approach to construct 
indicators of social cohesion as a societal feature. By not challenging the theoretical 
models, these studies merely reproduce the multidimensional conceptions of social 
cohesion advanced by these models. Rajulton et al (2007), for instance, have 
developed a composite index of social cohesion composed of three domains for 
census metropolitan areas (CMAs) in Canada. They remark that CMAs can 
compensate a low score on one domain with a high score on the two others and thus 
still achieve a relatively high ranking on social cohesion. They miss the point however 
that the social cohesion rankings thus obtained represent qualitatively different forms 
of social cohesion. CMAs with the same score on the social cohesion index can have 
very different social cohesion profiles, while CMAs with different scores may show 
quite similar profiles. These likely outcomes put the usefulness of composite 
multidimensional indexes into question. 
To my knowledge so far only Green et al (2003; 2006) have explored to what 
extent the social cohesion components suggested by various theoretical approaches 
co-vary. Their analysis which focused on national level characteristics produced a 
syndrome of social cohesion consisting of aggregate levels of social and institutional 
trust, civic compliance and (the absence of) violent crime. However, apart from 
highlighting social capital theory, they did not specify the theoretical approaches that 
inspired their selection of components and indicators, which makes this selection 
somewhat arbitrary.  
This study will adopt the same approach as Green et al but will be explicit 
about the theoretical models it utilizes. As the objective is not to embrace a particular 
theoretical model from the start and attempt to make it measurable but rather to 
critically scrutinize the consistency of the social cohesion models proposed by various 
theoretical approaches, the current study will not draw on one but on several 
theoretical approaches for its choice of indicators. Consequently, I start from an open 
and parsimonious definition of the concept which does not implicitly or explicitly 
convey a preference for any of the theoretical approaches: social cohesion – in my 
understanding – is simply the property that keeps societies from falling apart. This 
definition does betray one crucial assumption: social cohesion is a characteristic of a 
society, not of a community or other sub-state entity.  Green et al (2006) point out that 
only a macro-level understanding of social cohesion allows researchers to capture 
both inter- and intra-community conflicts within society. Equating social cohesion 
with social capital and considering it to be a local-level phenomenon would in their 
view not be able to detect the nature of inter-group relations (harmonious or 
antagonistic). In addition, Chan et al (2006) argue that social cohesion should not be 
seen as the property of an even higher level of analysis either because the sovereign 
state is still the prime policy maker and frame of reference for most citizens. I agree 
with these observations and will consequently only draw on theoretical approaches 
which understand social cohesion to be a societal-level phenomenon.  
Apart from considering only societal-level approaches I apply Moody and 
White‟s (2003) useful distinction between the ideational and relational dimension of 
social cohesion to broadly frame these approaches. The ideational dimension refers to 
shared norms, values and identities as the affective side of social cohesion. The 
relational dimension refers to the observed relationships between members within a 
collectivity. The concepts clearly have their origin in Durkheim‟s (1984) notions of 
mechanical and organic forms of solidarity, which he used to describe the nineteenth 
century transformation of society from a loose collection of small communities based 
on shared values and identities to a more integrated whole held together by inter-
dependencies and conflict-regulating mechanisms. Durkheim believed nonetheless 
that modern society also to some extent depended on shared values and feelings of 
belonging and he saw professional organizations as key agents in generating and 
maintaining such values and identities.  
The components of social cohesion highlighted by the societal-level 
approaches can all be classified as either representing the ideational or relational 
dimension of social cohesion. In addition to the aforementioned approaches of Green 
et al (2003) and Chan et al (2006), I have identified those of the Council of Europe 
(2005) and Kearns and Forrest (2000) as macro-level approaches. The Council of 
Europe (CoE) defines social cohesion as “society‟s ability to secure the long-term 
well-being of its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect 
for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and 
responsible participation” (Council of Europe, 2005: 23). Kearns and Forrest (2000: 
997) provide the following definition: “a socially cohesive society is one in which the 
members share common values which enable them to identify common aims and 
objectives, and share a common set of moral principles and codes of behavior through 
which to conduct their relations with one another”. They identify five “constituent 
components” of social cohesion: (1) common values and a civic culture; (2) social 
order and social control; (3) social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; (4) 
social networks and social capital, and (5) territorial belonging and identity (ibid. 
996). Table 1 shows the components highlighted by each approach and classifies 
these components as either ideational or relational. Kearns and Forrest‟s approach is 
clearly the most elaborate. The CoE‟s approach is mainly inspired by the relational 
and therefore organic solidarity dimension of social cohesion. By contrast, the 
ideational dimension predominates in the approach of Chan et al, heavily drawing 
from social capital theory as it does. The four approaches are thus very different in 
their understandings of social cohesion, which only adds to the relevance of assessing 
which of these approaches – if any – advances a reasonably coherent conception of 
the term. The components displayed will be operationalized and subjected to analysis 
in the ensuing sections.  
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
Social cohesion: a universal or regionally specific phenomenon 
 
Interestingly, the latest study of Green et al (2009) differs markedly from their 
previous studies in its approach to social cohesion. These previous studies, as noted 
above, aimed at identifying a coherent phenomenon of social cohesion at the societal 
level consisting of interlinked constituents. Rather than aiming to discover a general 
phenomenon of social cohesion applicable to all western states, the latest study sought 
to verify the empirical validity of claims about unique and durable „regimes‟ of social 
cohesion specific to a world region. Drawing on the literature about varieties of 
capitalism and civic culture (see below), it postulated the existence of four regionally 
based social cohesion regimes in OECD countries: (1) a liberal regime, marked by 
relatively low levels of equality and high levels of civic participation, value diversity 
and tolerance; (2) a social-democratic regime, characterized by high levels of equality 
and trust;  (3) a  conservative / social market regime, for which relatively low levels 
of civic participation and tolerance and relatively high levels social hierarchy and 
order are expected to be distinctive; (4) an East Asian regime, marked by high levels 
of equality and social hierarchy and low levels of value diversity and tolerance. Table 
2 provides a complete picture of these regimes, of the components they are expected 
to include and of the countries in which they are said to be prevailing. The signs in the 
table indicate relative levels. Thus, levels of social order are proposed to be low in the 
liberal regime countries compared to those of countries with other regimes. 
Performing cross-sectional analyses on administrative and aggregated survey data, 
Green et al (2009) found evidence for a distinct English-speaking liberal and a distinct 
Scandinavian social-democratic regime, while little empirical support was found for 
the existence of a social market regime comprising the countries of mainland Western 
Europe. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
The contrasting approaches of the studies of Green et al reflect the well-known 
opposition in the social sciences between „universalists‟ and „particularists‟ (the 
labeling is mine). The former believe that social phenomena are primarily the product 
of general processes with universal validity. The same processes should by and large 
yield the same outcomes irrespective of time, place and local culture. Socio-economic 
and political evolution proceed in the same way everywhere following similar stages 
of development. This line of thinking broadly characterizes scholars associated with 
modernization theory, such as Rostow (1960), Deutsch and Foltz (1963), and Pye and 
Verba (1963). Although this school of thought was losing popularity once it became 
apparent that the Third World countries were not following the same path of 
development as the Western countries, it remained influential among certain political 
and cultural theorists. Today the idea that socio-economic development drives the 
same process of value change everywhere around the globe is, for instance, clearly the 
key message of Ronald Inglehart‟s work. He argues that as agricultural societies 
industrialize they will experience a cultural change from  traditional religious to 
rational secular value orientations. Additionally, as industrialized societies become 
post-industrial, so their citizens will gradually consider post-materialist values to be 
more important than materialist ones (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
The particularists, by contrast, assert that social change does not follow the 
same logic of development everywhere. Countries, regions and cultures evolve in 
their own unique way, showing qualitatively different paths of socio-economic 
development. As Bendix (1964: 1 ) puts it:  
 
Belief in the universality of evolutionary stages has been replaced by the realization 
that the momentum of past events and the diversity of social structures lead to 
different paths of development, even where the changes of technology are identical. 
 
Scholars associated with this school of thought tend to understand culture as an 
enduring phenomenon shaping rather than being shaped by political and socio-
economic processes (e.g. Huntington 1996; Putnam 1993). A distinction can be drawn 
between hard-line and more moderate particularists. While the former assign absolute 
primacy to culture and civilization as the drivers of human agency (e.g. Huntington 
1996), the latter do not deny that modernization has produced commonalities among 
countries with similar levels of development but argue that despite these 
homogenizing pressures cultural and institutional differences persist. It is among the 
latter that we can place scholars who have identified various regimes of capitalism 
and scholars who have pointed to lasting differences between countries in the strength 
of civic culture. Authors of the first-named group include Hutton (1995), who has 
contrasted the shareholder model of  the English-speaking countries to the stakeholder 
model of mainland Europe, and Esping Andersen (1990), who has distinguished three 
enduring regimes of welfare capitalism among western states. Typical representatives 
of the second group are Kohn (1944, 1994), who claimed that a civic brand of 
nationalism prevails in western Europe and an ethnic illiberal variety predominates in 
central and eastern Europe, and Brubaker (1992), who argued that the contrasting 
principles on which the immigration and citizenship policies of France and Germany 
are based (Ius Solis versus Ius Sanguinis) are rooted in different conceptions of the 
nation (civic in France; ethnic in Germany). 
  As social cohesion in many definitions is understood as a broad phenomenon 
incorporating cultural, social, economic and political elements, it is pertinent to 
explore the concept in the light of the two contrasting perspectives. Is social cohesion 
a phenomenon that correlates closely with stages of socio-economic development? If 
so, the universalist view would be supported. Or can we identify enduring 
qualitatively different regimes of social cohesion among countries in a similar stage of 
socio-economic development, which would endorse the particularist school of 
thought? These are the key additional questions this study seeks to answer. From a 
policy perspective these questions are most relevant. If social cohesion is manifested 
in ways that are in agreement with the particularist perspective it makes no sense for 
countries to emulate social cohesion models from other societies because these 
models are culturally specific and path-dependent phenomena. If, on the other hand, 
social cohesion follows the logic of the universalist perspective, policies can be 
devised that promote socio-economic development and thereby engender more 
desirable forms of social cohesion.  
As the aforementioned pioneering works of Green et al have partially 
addressed these questions as well, it is important to highlight that this study aims to 
complement Green‟s studies in the following ways: (a) it not only seeks to explore the 
validity of the particularist perspective but also that of the universalist view, which 
was not an explicit objective of Green‟s studies; (b) it makes use of a much larger 
sample of countries (70 states worldwide, while Green‟s studies were restricted to 
OECD states); (c) it seeks to explore hypothesized regimes of social cohesion 
diachronically over a period of two decennia.  
 
 
Data and indicators 
 
The data presented in this section serve in first instance to tap the eight components of 
social cohesion as distilled from the four definitions discussed previously (i.e. the 
components displayed in Table 1). They also make it possible to scrutinize whether 
syndromes or regimes of social cohesion can be identified which are in agreement 
with the universalist or particularist perspective.  
I found one or more indicators for each of the eight components (see Table 3). 
These indicators all have their limitations, but compared to alternatives they seemed 
to be the best option. I acknowledge, for instance, that (the inverse of) the homicide 
rate is a very crude and one-sided measure of social order, but given the deplorable 
comparability of other cross-national crime statistics I preferred it over other 
indicators. Similarly, discussing politics with friends may be a good indicator for 
political engagement but it need not say anything about actual political participation. 
Using indicators of actual participation (such as voter turnout), however, have the 
drawback of not only tapping political engagement but also the possibility to 
participate (i.e. in authoritarian states people may feel very engaged but they are 
likely to be prohibited from expressing this in terms of actual participation).  
 As Table 3 further shows, the data have been taken from a variety of sources. 
The data for all the subjective indicators have been drawn from the 1999-2004 Wave 
of the World Values Survey, the only international opinion survey with a global 
scope. The data of five of these indicators are national means, those of three indicators 
represent percentages, while those of the four indicators for the „shared values‟ 
component represent the inverse of national-level standard deviations (SDs). I made 
sure that the indicators based on administrative data (the gini coefficient and the 
homicide rate) matched the years of the 1999-2004 Wave as closely as possible. Thus 
all data pertain to the end of the 1990s and early 2000s. I compiled data on as many as 
70 countries worldwide. The analyses were sometimes based on less than 50 
countries, however, due to missing data. 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
The indicators selected to measure the shared values component deserve further 
explanation. Of course we need to ask ourselves „which values‟ when we seek to 
assess the degree of consensus on them. Unsurprisingly, there is no agreement about 
the values that matter. While Bellah et al. (1985), for instance, deem a common 
Christian morality to be the glue that holds society together (a morality that they think 
has been eroded by individualism), Almond and Verba (1963) and Dahl (1967) argue 
that values relating to the institutions of democracy are key. Social cohesion, in their 
view, is assured when citizens agree on the political institutions and procedures and 
on the ways to participate in them. Given the disagreement about which values should 
be shared, we selected no less than four indicators to tap into a variety of values. Two 
of these are composite dimensions comprising a range of socio-cultural attitudes and 
thus partly addressing the morality Bellah et al consider crucial. These are the 
dimensions traditional versus secular values and survival versus self-expression 
values created by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) by means of factor analysis. Both 
dimensions represent coherent syndromes of values and can be seen as continuums. 
Low values on the first dimension represent religious and traditional orientations 
while high values denote secular beliefs. Low values on the second dimension 
represent materialist convictions while high values denote post-materialist 
orientations. Appendix 1 shows the composition of both dimensions. The other two 
indicators concern support for the democratic system and support for gender equality, 
which thus tap more into political and civic values. 
 
 
Results 
 
Assessing the four theoretical approaches 
 
I start by assessing whether the definitions of social cohesion offered by the four 
approaches discussed previously represent coherent syndromes. For this to be the 
case, the components included in these definitions have to co-vary and show a strong 
relation to a latent factor. I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (using the default 
option in SPSS) on the indicators of social cohesion shown in Table 3 to explore these 
relationships. This analysis is based on a sample of 41 countries worldwide. The 
default option is the un-rotated solution using listwise deletion of missing values. It is 
programmed to produce a minimum number of latent unrelated factors explaining a 
maximum amount of the variance in the indicators. In other words, it tries to 
„squeeze‟ the variation in as many indicators as possible in one factor. Consequently, 
if the collection of indicators captured by the first factor is not in line with any of the 
definitions, we can be fairly sure that none of these definitions reflect a coherent 
syndrome of social cohesion.  
 The analysis produces four factors (see Table 4). This already tells us that 
comprehensive theoretical understandings of social cohesion are not likely to reflect 
coherent real-life phenomena. The first factor shows strong correlations (i.e. loadings 
of more than .50 or less then -.50) with nine indicators and explains 32 per cent of the 
variance. It comprises equality, social trust, social order, sexual tolerance, national 
skepticism (as indicated by the negative loading of national pride), disparities on the 
traditional/secular and survival/self-expression values indicators (as indicated by 
negative loadings of these indicators), and consensus on support for democracy and 
gender equality. The core components of this factor are social trust, equality and 
disparities on traditional/secular values with loadings of .7 and higher or -.7 and 
lower. Similarly, the second factor captures civic participation, ethnic tolerance, lack 
of institutional trust, national pride and pluralism on gender equality (which all have 
loadings of more than .50 or less than -.50), has civic participation as core component 
(i.e. with a loading of more than .70) and accounts for 20 per cent of the variance. The 
remaining two factors each comprise just one indicator (political discussions and level 
of belonging). Given their insignificance we chose to disregard them in further 
analyses.  
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
I am thus left with two factors. Given the variety of indicators they comprise it is not 
easy to find appropriate labels, but in view of their core components I provisionally 
call them „solidarity‟ and „participation‟. I saved the country scores on these factors. 
High scores on the solidarity factor thus represent high levels of social trust, equality, 
diversity on religious/secular values, etc; low scores represent their opposite. A 
similar logic applies to the participation factor. 
 Interestingly, the four shared values indicators are related in opposite ways to 
the solidarity factor: the higher the score on solidarity, the greater the disparities on 
religious/secular and survival/self-expression values and the smaller the disparities on 
support for gender equality and democracy. It highlights all the more the need to 
distinguish between values in examining how shared values relate to social cohesion. 
More intriguingly, it seems to sustain the idea that societies can handle substantial 
degrees of cultural pluralism on a plethora of issues provided there is consensus on a 
number of key norms and values regulating inter-group conflicts (Parsons 1970). This 
somewhat contradicts the opinion put forward by Mann (1970: 423) that social 
cohesion does not depend on value consensus but on the “pragmatic acceptance by 
subordinate classes of their limited roles in society”. More research into the precise 
role of shared values is needed, however, to state this conclusion with more certainly.  
 Most  importantly, however, the factors extracted are not in agreement with 
any of the definitions of the aforementioned macro-level approaches. In other words, 
these approaches all advance incoherent, multidimensional conceptions of social 
cohesion. Remarkably, even the model proposed by Green et al is not in line with any 
of the factors even though it is based on empirical analysis (institutional trust is not 
correlated with social trust and social order, as in Green‟s model, but with tolerance 
and civic participation; the inconsistency with the findings of Green et al is probably 
explained by the fewer number of countries in their study).  
The fact that the aforementioned conceptions of social cohesion do not 
represent coherent syndromes does not rule out the possibility that the social cohesion 
profiles of specific countries are in line with these conceptions. This would be the 
case if these countries exhibit all the components of social cohesion proposed by these 
conceptions. As Figure 1 shows, there are indeed four countries – Sweden, Denmark, 
Netherlands and to a somewhat lesser extent Finland – that have high values on both 
the solidarity and participation factor and that are thus very likely to combine high 
levels of social trust, equality, order, sexual tolerance and consensus on basic values 
with high levels of participation, ethnic tolerance and national pride. The social 
cohesion profiles of these countries can thus be said be in agreement with the 
definitions of social cohesion proposed by the Council of Europe, Chan et al and 
Kearns and Forrest and to approximate that of Green et al. Whether the profiles of 
these countries can be conceived of as distinct regional and historically evolved 
regimes of social cohesion, which would be supportive of the particularist 
perspective, or only as an accidental and short-lived combination of conditions is a 
question I will return to below. For now, the finding that the four conceptions of 
social cohesion do not reflect coherent phenomena but only the profiles of a few 
specific countries indicates that these conceptions are unlikely to represent forms of 
social cohesion that can easily be pursued and adopted by other countries. Their 
usefulness in policy terms may thus be quite limited.   
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Assessing the universalist perspective 
 
This leads us to the question whether the observed factors are related to stages of 
socio-economic development. If they are, the universalist/modernist perspective 
would be supported and the forms of social cohesion they represent might be 
amenable to policy intervention. It needs to be noted, however, that this study‟s 
identification of (at least) two factors of social cohesion is difficult to reconcile with 
the universalist perspective as this perspective would expect to find a single, 
universally valid syndrome of social cohesion. I used World Bank data on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) (World Bank 2001) as a proxy for socio-economic development: 
the higher the PPP per capita of a country, the more advanced I consider its stage of 
development to be. Figures 2 and 3 show that there are highly significant positive 
links between PPP per capita and each of the two social cohesion factors. The link 
with solidarity is particularly strong: PPP per capita explains as much as 43 per cent 
of the variation in solidarity. Thus, solidarity and participation indeed appear to be a 
function of level of development, which is in agreement with the universalist 
perspective. 
Considering again the composition of both factors, the direction of the relation 
moreover makes sense, particularly for the solidarity factor: the more advanced a 
country is socio-economically, the more trusting, equal, safe, and tolerant its society 
is, and the more likely it is to combine consensus on basic values with pluralism on 
substantive values. This concurs with theoretical expectations. Social trust is likely to 
represent trust in the anonymous fellow citizen as it was tapped with the item “most 
people can be trusted / you cannot be too careful”. This kind of „thin‟ trust is typically 
high in advanced post-industrial states where the bonds between the citizens are 
manifold and based on mutual dependencies. By contrast, „thick‟ exclusionary forms 
of trust reflecting close relations with family members and suspicion of strangers are 
characteristic of isolated rural communities which predominate in societies in the 
early stage of modernization (Newton 1999). Likewise, it is not surprising to find 
advanced states having more equal societies. The burgeoning middle classes, 
dwindling working classes and extensive public welfare systems of these states have 
significantly reduced inequalities of income and opportunity. The rapidly 
industrializing societies in the take-off phase modernization, in contrast, are coping 
with dramatic inequalities (Kuznets 1955). It also makes sense to expect order and 
compliance to be stronger in advanced societies. Rising living standards reduce the 
need to break the law and the extensive monitoring and prosecution capacities of the 
state increase the risk of capture and punishment. Similarly, one can expect to find 
higher tolerance levels in advanced societies. The development of conflict-mediating 
and mollifying institutions, including public welfare arrangements, has enabled these 
societies to deal with ever increasing levels of pluralism and has made the citizens of 
such societies become accustomed to cultural diversity and develop  an attitude of 
respect for people with different ideas and lifestyles (Crepaz 2009; Evans and Toth 
2008). Finally, the finding that advanced societies typically combine pluralism on 
substantive values with consensus on basic political values is consistent with the 
notion that western liberal democratic states can tolerate considerable value diversity 
because they have developed widely accepted norms and institutions regulating inter-
group relations (Dahl 1967; Rose 1969). 
The relation between socio-economic development and the participation factor 
suggests the following regularities: the more advanced a society, the higher its civic 
participation rates, the lower the trust in institutions, and the higher the levels of 
national pride. The higher participation rates in advanced societies make sense 
theoretically because citizens in affluent democratic states have the resources and 
opportunities to engage in civic participation. The lower institutional trust levels in 
advanced societies are at first sight surprising because public institutions in these 
societies have more financial means at their disposal and are therefore more effective 
in meeting the needs and demands of citizens than institutions in poorer societies. 
However, people in post-industrial societies have also become more critical of 
authority and hierarchy as part of the wider cultural transition from materialist to post-
materialist values (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Dalton 2004). These cultural changes are 
likely to have had a greater impact on people‟s evaluations of public institutions than 
the performance of these institutions. The higher levels of national pride in advanced 
societies are more difficult to grasp theoretically, though. One would expect 
secularization, individualization and the change to postmaterialism to have 
undermined collective identities, such as a sense of national pride, in these societies 
and thus to find higher levels of national pride in poorer societies. In sum, in view of 
the components of the two factors, the relation of socio-economic development with 
participation is slightly more difficult to interpret theoretically than the link of socio-
economic development with solidarity.  
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Assessing the particularist perspective 
 
In addition to the close relationships of solidarity and participation with socio-
economic development, Figures 2 and 3 also show remarkable variation in the factor 
scores of countries with similar levels of PPP. While being as poor as some Latin-
American states, the post-communist countries, for instance, have solidarity levels 
equal to the ones of many affluent western states. The reverse applies for 
participation. On this factor the African and Latin-American states have levels of 
participation which are equal to or sometimes exceeding those of western states, and it 
is the post-communist states recording the lowest levels. Moreover, the variation 
between the – more or less equally prosperous - western states is substantial: while 
Sweden tops the list Germany has a participation level that is as low as most post-
communist states. All this indicates that solidarity and participation levels are not only 
a reflection of socio-economic development. Historical trajectories unique to each 
region are likely to have left their imprint as well, thus providing purchase to the 
particularist perspective. 
The low participation levels of post-communist countries clearly support this 
observation. As many authors have pointed out, decades of totalitarian, communist 
rule have wiped out civil society in these countries and have made people suspicious 
of state institutions (Janmaat 2006; Schoepflin 2000; Smolar 1996). The legacy of this 
period has been “hourglass” societies, composed of a mass of citizens minding their 
own business at the bottom, economic and political elites vying for power and wealth 
at the top, and a “missing middle” of minimal connections between these groups 
(Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1997: 91). This raises the pertinent question of how 
lasting this legacy will be. Can we expect post-communist societies to overcome this 
heritage within the years to come and revert to levels of participation „in line‟ with 
their level of socio-economic development? Or has civil society always been a 
phenomenon alien to this region and was there thus little for communism to destroy? 
In that case participation levels may well stay low for the next decades or centuries.  
Phrased more broadly, if we can identify regimes of social cohesion – for 
instance a regime of post-communist countries comprising relatively high levels of 
solidarity and low levels of participation -  how durable are they? Do they extend over 
generations or possibly centuries, or are they relatively short-lived phenomena, 
perhaps so short-lived that it is more appropriate to talk of temporary clusters of 
conditions rather than regimes? Unfortunately but not surprisingly, it is next to 
impossible to empirically scrutinize the existence of longue duree regimes of social 
cohesion because opinion surveys, which are essential for exploring the ideational 
dimension of social cohesion, have been conducted only from the 1950s onwards. 
Only by relying on archival data of behavior – as Putnam (1993) has famously done 
for his study on civic culture in Italy – or on secondary sources – such as the 
observations of early scholars like De Tocqueville on American society in the mid-
nineteenth century – can a (necessarily incomplete) case be made for social cohesion 
regimes with deep historical roots. However, the different waves of the WVS do 
allow us to explore continuities in attitudinal components over a 20 year period. Thus, 
we can at least determine whether some „regime‟ is nothing more than an accidental 
coincidence of conditions at a single point in time or whether it represents a stable 
collection of properties over two decades. If the latter is the case, we have some 
provisional indication of the existence of long-term regimes of social cohesion.  
I will use the first (1981-84), the second (1989-93) and the fourth (1999-04) 
wave of the WVS to explore the regimes hypothesized by Green et al (2009) (i.e. the 
regimes shown in Table 2). These regimes, it must be admitted, only relate to the 
prosperous countries. I chose to confine myself to these countries since it is only for 
this group that longitudinal data are available, making it possible to explore regime 
stability. I added two more indicators based on WVS items to the existing set of 
indicators in order to tap the hypothesized regimes as closely as possible. These are 
active civic participation and respect for parents. The first is a compound index based 
on 15 items about reported voluntary work for a range of organizations. It represents 
the mean of the number of different organizations the respondent does voluntary work 
for (see Appendix 1). The second represents mean values and taps the component of 
social hierarchy (see Appendix 2 for the full wording of the item). Since the 
postulated regimes did not make specific claims about the level or the strength of a 
shared sense of belonging I omitted the two indicators on identity. I further had to 
omit all four indicators on value diversity because of missing values in the first wave. 
Instead, I selected the materialism-postmaterialism values scale and used the SDs of 
this scale as a measure of value diversity. This scale consists of four items and is a 
subset of the aforementioned survival-selfexpression values scale (see Appendix 2). 
Lastly, data from the UN and World Bank on homicides (social order) and income 
gini (equality) were collected for the years 1981 and 1990 to match the survey data of 
the first and second wave of the WVS. I thus proceed with ten indicators for which 
data were found for the three points in time noted above. Table 5 lists these indicators 
and the components of the proposed regimes they are meant to tap. 
 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 
Testing the regimes proposed by Green et al (2009) involves asking three questions: 
(1) to what extent do the patterns in the data match the expected substance of the 
regimes?; (2) to what extent can we find the hypothesized country clusters?; (3) how 
stable are the substance and country clusters found in the data? I used group means 
and hierarchical cluster analysis to explore questions 1 and 3, and 2 and 3, 
respectively. To begin with group means, I assigned sixteen OECD countries to the 
regimes they are expected to exemplify and calculated the regime mean score on each 
of the indicators for each of the three waves. Table 5 presents the results of these 
computations. It also includes the overall mean so that we can assess whether a 
particular group has a relatively high or low score on some indicator. Low scores 
more than one standard deviation (SD) from the overall mean are given in italics; low 
scores less than one SD from the overall mean are in normal style; high scores less 
than one SD from the mean are given in bold; high scores more than one SD are in 
bold and italics.  
It turns out that the data of Table 5 are broadly in line with the proposed 
regimes substantively. Indeed we see that the liberal group of countries has relatively 
high levels of inequality, crime, tolerance and civic participation (both active and 
passive). Likewise, the social democratic Nordics are relatively high on social trust 
and low on crime and inequality. The continental group conforms to the expected 
regime by showing relatively low levels of crime and passive and active participation, 
and medium levels of income inequality. The predicted strong social hierarchies and 
exclusionary ethno-cultural identities of the East-Asian regime are confirmed by East 
Asia‟s high score on respect for parents and very low score on ethnic tolerance. Yet, 
we also find scores not in line with the predicted regimes. Thus, for a „conservative 
regime demanding moral consensus‟ we find surprisingly high value diversity in the 
European continental group of countries. By contrast, value pluralism is surprisingly 
low in the liberal societies. Likewise, the assumed individualism of these societies 
does not prevent them from showing relatively high levels of respect for parents. 
Lastly, the high ethnic tolerance levels of continental Europe are difficult to match 
with their supposedly exclusionary ethnic identities. 
Table 5 also allows us to assess the stability of the proposed regimes. The 
overall picture is ambiguous. On some components the mean scores are fairly stable 
over the three points in time for all four groups, which is consistent with the idea of 
relatively enduring regimes of social cohesion. This is the case with social order, 
social hierarchy and value diversity. On other components some groups show 
relatively stable scores while others have more volatile patterns. This can be seen for 
inequality (stable levels in the English-speaking and Continental European groups but 
declining ones in the Nordics and in East Asia), social trust (declining in the English-
speaking group and stable in the other groups),  passive participation (stable in the 
English-speaking and continental group, but rising sharply in the Nordics), and ethnic 
tolerance and political trust (declining sharply in East Asia and stable in the other 
groups). Finally, there is one indicator (active participation) on which all four groups 
show sharply rising levels over the 20 year period.  
The second question stated above was explored with hierarchical cluster 
analysis. In this analysis the forming of clusters of cases occurs in a series of stages. 
At each stage the two cases (or clusters of cases) that are most similar on all the 
variables are clustered.  Thus, the further the analysis proceeds the fewer clusters 
remain but the larger the differences between the clusters become and the more 
heterogeneous the clusters become internally. In other words, in the initial stages it 
produces many clusters which are relatively homogenous internally and in the final 
stages just a few highly diversified clusters are left over (Cramer 2003). The best 
visual representation of this process is a dendrogram, which displays the different 
clusters as horizontal lines on the x-axis. The higher the value on this axis, the fewer 
the number of clusters and thus the more internally diverse each cluster is. The 
branching points on the axis (i.e. the moments when new clusters are formed) offer 
good insight into the internal homogeneity of each cluster for a specific cluster 
solution (by cluster solution we mean the number of clusters produced at a certain 
stage). 
Figure 4 shows three such dendrograms, one for each wave.
1
 We used the 
same countries and indicators for each of these analyses to ensure over time 
comparability. Japan, South Korea were excluded because these countries had missing 
data for passive and active participation in the first wave. The remaining European 
and American countries are thus expected to fall in just three clusters – an English-
speaking one; a Scandinavian one and a Continental European. Focusing on the 
dendrogram of the last wave, we can see that the three cluster solution (as shown by 
the three horizontal lines) only partially corresponds to the predicted country 
groupings. We can indeed discern a distinct Scandinavian cluster composed of 
Denmark and Sweden although the Netherlands also forms part of this. Likewise we 
see a large continental European continental but this group is heavily „polluted‟ with 
English-speaking countries (Britain, Ireland and Canada). The US forms a separate 
cluster. In short, an English-speaking group of countries cannot at all be identified. 
Thus, the geographic dispersion of English-speaking countries could be said to be 
emblematic of their disparate social cohesion characters.  
 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
A comparison of the three dendrograms over time confirms the relative cohesion of 
the Scandinavian group and the absence of an English-speaking cluster. We can see 
                                                 
1
 We used standardized variables (Z-scores) for these cluster analyses as this ensures that each variable 
is given equal weight in the analyses. 
that Denmark, Sweden and to a somewhat lesser extent the Netherlands always stick 
together. In the first wave they are accompanied by Britain and Canada but these 
countries move to the continental European cluster in the second and third wave 
respectively. We further see that Italy moves from a separate position to the 
continental cluster in the second wave.   
In short, the data provide only partial support for the „stable regimes of social 
cohesion‟ hypothesis. Whether a predicted regime can be identified substantively or in 
terms of the countries it is said to include depends on the indicators and countries 
examined. Two clusters seem to be quite stable – a continental European one with 
Belgium, Germany, France, and Spain as core countries and a Scandinavian one 
grouping Denmark and Sweden – and these could thus possibly be conceived of as 
regimes. However, the unexpected companions in these clusters (Ireland and the 
Netherlands respectively) and the transfers of Britain, Canada and Italy undermine 
their external distinctiveness and put their longevity into question.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analyses of this study have shown that none of conceptions of social cohesion 
proposed by a number of macro-level approaches refers to a coherent empirical 
phenomenon visible in a large number of states that could be labeled social cohesion. 
As these conceptions thus constitute merely multidimensional theoretical constructs, 
their use for empirical and policy-oriented approaches can legitimately be questioned. 
Working with such constructs is problematic in policy terms because interventions 
aimed at improving social cohesion as a whole could well have differential effects 
(positive and negative) for the constituent components of social cohesion.  
 A factor analysis on all the components of social cohesion suggested by the 
macro-level approaches produced four factors, two of which captured most of the 
variance. The first of these I labeled „solidarity‟ because of the high loadings of social 
trust, equality, consensus on basic values and social order on this factor. The second 
was labeled „participation‟ as it comprised civic participation as its main component 
and was further found to be related to ethnic tolerance, national pride, and (a lack of) 
institutional trust. Both factors showed a strong positive correlation with GDP per 
capita. I considered this finding to be supportive of the universalist/modernist notion 
that social cohesion should be related to stages of socio-economic development.  
More difficult to reconcile with the universalist perspective was the finding 
that the post-communist and Latin-American countries differed conspicuously on both 
factors while showing approximately equal levels of socio-economic development. It 
suggested that historical processes unique to each region also play a role in shaping 
social cohesion to the point that it is appropriate to speak of regionally distinct and 
relatively enduring „regimes‟ of social cohesion. This finding is more in line with an 
ideographic/particularist understanding of social cohesion. Putting this perspective to 
the test also produced mixed evidence, however. Verifying the substance, the country 
membership and the stability of the four regimes of social cohesion postulated by 
Green et al (2009), I found evidence for a reasonably distinctive and stable 
Scandinavian model characterized by high trust, (declining) inequality and low crime 
rates. I also identified a continental European cluster but this group saw several 
English-speaking countries joining it in the 1990s and exhibited unexpectedly low 
levels of social hierarchy and surprisingly high levels of value pluralism and ethnic 
tolerance. I found no evidence at all for a distinctive liberal English-speaking regime 
of social cohesion. 
Due to data limitations, I could only assess the regime stability for this limited 
group of Western countries, however. Possibly, the particularist perspective would 
have received more solid support had I been able to examine social cohesion 
characteristics longitudinally for other world regions, such as Latin America and the 
post-communist countries.  Particularly over-time public opinion data is in short 
supply for these regions. It is therefore recommendable that future research exploring 
the dynamics of social cohesion in non-western contexts rely less on attitudinal and 
more on behavioral indicators (also as proxies for attitudes), using records and other 
archival material as data sources.  
Notwithstanding the indicative and incomplete conclusions of this study 
regarding the validity of the universalist and particularist perspectives, I believe to 
have advanced the research on social cohesion in two other ways. First, the discovery 
that civic participation does not co-vary at the national level with social trust indicates 
the limited empirical utility of social capital-inspired definitions of social cohesion, 
such as the aforementioned one by Chan To and Chan. After all, the non-relation 
between trust and participation suggests that it is very difficult to develop forms of 
social cohesion that combine the two. Yet, and secondly, this does not exclude the 
possibility that there are countries combining relatively high levels of trust and civic 
participation (or any of the other characteristics of social cohesion seen as precious 
and worth pursuing for that matter). In fact, our analyses found the Scandinavian 
countries to manifest just such forms of social cohesion. They constitute so to speak 
the living proof for many theoretical and normative understandings of the concept. 
Yet, since the kind of social cohesion seen in Scandinavian countries is likely to 
constitute a regime, i.e. a path-dependent stable collection of characteristics unique to 
the region, it cannot be adopted by other countries or only with great difficulty. In this 
sense, definitions of social cohesion that reflect such regimes present unattainable 
forms of social cohesion, i.e. forms not achievable by other states. By contrast, efforts 
to reduce income inequality and crime and to enhance trust and consensus on basic 
values simultaneously could well be effective since these components do co-vary 
cross-nationally (to form the „solidarity‟ syndrome alluded to above) and are closely 
related to socio-economic development. We thus believe that the value of this paper 
lies in having identified a form of social cohesion that can realistically be pursued. 
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Table 1. Components of social cohesion suggested by four macro-level approaches 
 
 Macro-level approaches 
 
 Green et al Chan et al Council of 
Europe 
Kearns and 
Forrest 
     
Ideational Social trust 
 
Social trust  Common values 
  
 
Sense of 
belonging 
 Sense of 
belonging 
  
 
   
Relational Institutional trust Civic participation 
/ social capital 
Civic 
participation 
/political 
engagement 
Civic participation 
/ social capital 
 Social order and 
compliance 
 Tolerance * Social order and 
compliance 
  
 
 Equality Equality 
 
* properly speaking tolerance is ideational as it represents an attitude. I classified it as relational 
however as it is relevant for the regulation of inter-group relations in modern societies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Regimes of social cohesion proposed by Green et al (2009: 94, 95, 101) 
 
 Liberal Social-
democratic 
Conservative East Asian 
Equality - + +/- + 
Order  - +/- + + 
Civic 
participation 
(active and 
passive) 
+ +/- - - 
Social trust +/- + +/- +/- 
Tolerance + +/- - - 
Cultural pluralism + + - - 
Social hierarchy - - + + 
     
Countries English-
speaking 
Scandinavian Continental 
European 
Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan 
 
Table 3. Operationalization of social cohesion components 
 
Component Indicator Item(s) in survey Data source 
Common values Consensus on traditional-secular values 
(1.5 - SD) 
Consensus on survival-selfexpression 
values  (1.5 - SD) 
 
Consensus on gender equality (1 - SD) 
 
Consensus on democracy as preferred 
system (1 - SD) 
 Composite dimension called „Tradrat5‟ in WVS database;  
 
Composite dimension called „Survself‟ in WVS database; 
 
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (agree; neither; 
disagree) 
 For each one of the following political systems, how good a way would you say it is of 
governing this country? - Having a democratic political system (very good; fairly good; 
fairly bad; very bad) 
WVS 1999 
Shared sense of 
belonging 
Geographic unit of identification (mean) 
 
National pride (mean) 
Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? (locality or 
town; region; country; continent; world) 
How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen? (not at all proud; not very proud; quite 
proud; very proud) 
WVS 1999 
Social trust Percentage saying most people can be 
trusted 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too 
careful in dealing with people? (most people can be trusted; can‟t be too careful) 
WVS 1999 
Tolerance Percentage not mentioning immigrants as 
unwanted neighbours 
Percentage not mentioning homosexuals as 
unwanted neighbours 
Which people would you not like to have as neighbours? 
-  Immigrants/foreign workers (mentioned; not mentioned) 
-  Homosexuals (mentioned; not mentioned) 
WVS 1999 
Institutional 
trust 
Trust in parliament (mean) How much confidence do you have in Parliament? (none at all; not very much; quite a lot; a 
great deal) 
WVS 1999 
Civic 
participation 
 
 
political 
engagement 
Number of different organizations 
respondent belongs to (mean) 
 
 
 
Discussing politics with friends (mean) 
Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say 
which, if any, do you belong to:  
 [respondent can choose from 9 different organizations – see Appendix 1] (mentioned; not 
mentioned) 
 
How often do you discuss political matters with friends? (Never; Occasionally; Frequently) 
WVS 1999 
Social order 100 minus number of homicides per 
100.000 inhabitants 
 UN 
Equality 1 minus Gini coefficient  of income 
inequality   
 World Bank 
Table 4. Dimensional structure of social cohesion indicators (factor loadings) 
 
 
  Extracted dimensions 
Components of 
social cohesion 
 Indicators of social cohesion ‘solidarity’ ‘participation’ 3 
 
4 
 
Civic participation 
/ political 
engagement 
Discussing politics 
 
.40 -.37 .64 .26 
Belonging to different 
organizations 
.09 .75 .43 .35 
 
Tolerance 
No objection to immigrants as 
neighbours 
.32 .52 -.27 -.02 
No objection to homosexuals as 
neighbours 
.59 .46 -.45 -.14 
Social trust Most people can be trusted 
 
.81 .33 -.07 .12 
Institutional trust Trust in parliament  
 
.05 -.61 -.49 .04 
 
 
Common values 
Consensus  on gender equality 
 
.62 -.53 .16 -.27 
Consensus on democracy as 
preferred system 
.50 -.29 -.25 .27 
Consensus on traditional/secular 
values 
-.86 -.28 -.15 .19 
Consensus on 
survival/selfexpression values 
-.62 -.33 -.46 -.07 
Shared sense of 
belonging 
National pride 
 
-.52 .68 -.07 -.35 
Geographic unit of identification 
 
-.45 .11 -.39 .62 
Social order 100 minus number of homicides 
 
.58 .04 -.09 .28 
Equality 1 minus Gini coefficient 
 
.76 .28 -.35 .04 
      
Explained 
variance 
 32% 20% 12% 7% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Country scores on the solidarity and participation factors 
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Figure 2. The relation between solidarity and economic prosperity 
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  r = .66; p = .000; R
2
 = .43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The relation between participation and economic prosperity 
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r =.42; p = .006; R
2 
= .18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. The substance of social cohesion models (group means on social cohesion indicators) 
 
  Liberal 
Anglophone 
Conservative 
Continental 
European 
Social-democratic 
Scandinavian 
 
East-Asian 
 
Overall mean 
Components  Indicators 1981 1990 1999 1981 1990 1999 1981 1990 1999 1981 1990 1999 1981 1990 1999 
Civic 
participation 
Passive (belonging to) 1.03 .95 1.14 .60 .75 .82 1.18 1.40 1.98 - .61 .77 .89 .94 1.13 
Active (doing voluntary work) .40 .47 .72 .30 .33 .30 .32 .32 .47 .08 .07 .25 .33 .35 .46 
Trust Most people can be trusted 44.7 48.7 34.9 31.2 35.9 36.4 52.6 58.1 59.8 39.4 38.0 34.3 40.7 44.9 41.6 
Trust in parliament 47.4 45.0 36.5 45.4 44.2 41.6 56.0 50.6 60.2 53.6 31.5 16.3 49.6 44.4 41.8 
Tolerance Immigrants as neighbours 91.9 91.9 89.5 89.3 86.1 88.4 93.7 89.0 93.5 94.7 65.0 68.3 91.7 85.6 87.4 
Cultural pluralism Postmaterialism scale (SDs) .61 .63 .58 .66 .67 .64 .62 .58 .52 .60 .64 .57 .63 .63 .59 
Social hierarchy Respect for parents 70.9 72.3 73.0 69.9 71.1 64.6 50.4 51.0 48.2 80.3 86.0 82.0 66.6 68.3 64.8 
Inequality Gini coefficient 37.3 35.3 37.0 31.9 30.3 31.9 33.2 25.0 27.2 34.2 30.0 27.4 33.9 30.5 31.7 
Crime (inverse of 
social order) 
number of homicides per 
100.000 
3.52 3.38 2.45 1.22 1.23 1.38 1.13 1.20 1.08 1.00 .60 1.55 1.84 1.79 1.59 
 N (countries) 4 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 2 2 2 16 16 16 
 
The Anglophone group includes the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland;  
The Continental European group includes Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy; 
The Scandinavian group includes Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Finland; 
The East-Asian group includes Japan and South Korea. 
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Figure 4. Country membership of social cohesion models (hierarchical cluster analyses) 
 
First Wave (1981) 
  Case     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  DEN       3    
  SWE       9         
  GB       10         
  CAN       2           
  NL        7       
  IRE       5                         
  SP        8                       
  FRA       4                        
  B         1                                    
  GER W    12                                          
  ITA       6                 
  USA      11   
 
Second wave (1990) 
  Case     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  ITA       6    
  SP        8               
  GB       10             
  GER W    12            
  FRA       4              
  IRE       5                    
  B         1           
  DEN       3                                        
  SWE       9                                         
  NL        7                                
  CAN       2                                 
  USA      11   
 
Fourth wave (1999)               
  Case     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  IRE       5    
  ITA       6    
  GB       10           
  FRA       4     
  SP        8              
  GER W    12        
  B         1                            
  CAN       2                           
  NL        7                                    
  SWE       9                      
  DEN       3                                     
  USA      11   
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Appendix 1. Composition of social cohesion indicators 
 
 
The composition of the religious-secular and survival-selfexpression dimensions: 
 
Items from WVS Traditional-
religious vs 
rational-secular 
values * 
Survival vs 
selfexpression 
values ** 
 Factor loadings Factor loadings 
God is not very important in respondent‟s life .91  
It is less important for a child to learn obedience 
and religious faith than independence and 
determination (autonomy index) 
.88  
Abortion is always justifiable .82  
Respondent does not have a strong sense of 
national pride 
.81  
Respondent opposes more respect for authority .73  
Respondent gives priority to self-expression and 
quality of life over economic and physical security 
(4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index 
***) 
 .87 
Respondent describes self as very happy  .81 
Homosexuality is always justifiable  .77 
Respondent has or would sign a petition  .74 
Most people can be trusted  .46 
 
* secular is positive pole; ** selfexpression is positive pole; *** see Appendix 2. 
 
Nb: adapted from Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 49).  
 
 
Items composing the civic participation indicator: 
 
“Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and 
say which, if any, you belong to:” 
 
- social welfare for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; 
 -religious or church organizations;  
- education, arts, music or cultural activities; 
- trade unions; 
- political parties; 
- third world development or human rights;  
- conservation, environment, animal rights groups; 
- professional associations;  
- youth work; 
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A   not mentioned;  
B   mentioned 
 
Active civic participation: Respondents were also asked whether they did voluntary work 
for these nine different organizations.  
 
Appendix 2. Additional social cohesion indicators drawn from WVS 
 
 
Respect for parents: 
 
“Which of the two statements do you tend to agree with? < A – regardless of what the 
qualities and faults of ones parents are, one must always love and respect them; B – One 
does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their 
behaviour and attitudes” 
 
 
Items composing Materialism-Postmaterialism index*: 
 
Maintaining order in the nation (-) 
Giving people more say in the decisions of the government (+) 
Fight rising prices (-) 
Protect freedom of speech (+) 
 
* Postmaterialism = positive pole; a minus indicates that the item is negatively correlated 
with the index, a plus indicates a positive correlation 
 
See Inglehart (1990) for a full description. 
 
 
 
